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A new approach to research and theory development for financial firms 
-Building a ‘house with windows’      
 
Abstract    
 
Purpose: 
The aims of this paper are to: rethink empirical models and theory used in explaining banks and financial 
institutions (FIs); and to enhance the process of theory construction. 
 
This is a provisional response to Colander et al (2009), Gendron at al (2013) call for a new approach to 
developing theory for finance and financial institutions 
 
Approach: 
An embryonic ‘behavioural theory of the financial firm’ (BTFF) is outlined based on: field research about 
banks and FI firms; and relevant literature. 
 
The paper explores ‘conceptual connections’ between BTFF and traditional finance theory ideas of financial 
intermediation (FTFI). It does not seek to ‘integrate’ finance theory and alternative theory in ‘meta theory’, 
and has a more modest aim is to improve theory content through ‘connections’ 
 
Findings: 
The ‘conceptual connections’ provide a means to develop ideas proposed by Scholtens and Wensveen (2003. 
They are part of a ‘house with windows’ intended to provide systematic means to ‘take data from the outside 
world’ whilst continuously recognising ‘the complexities of the context’ (Keasey and Hudson, 2007), to both 
challenge and build the core ideas of finance theory. 
 
Research implications:  
The BTFF is a means to create ‘conversations’ between academics, practitioners and regulators to aid theory 
construction. This can overcome the limitations of such embryonic theory. 
 
Practical implications: 
The ideas developed create new opportunities to: develop finance theory; propose changes in banks and FIs; 
and suggest changes in the focus of regulation. 
 
Originality/value 
Regulators can use the expanded conceptual framework to encourage theory development and to enhance 
accountability of banks and FIs to citizens. 
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Introduction 
 
  The paper seeks to rethink empirical models and theory used in explaining banks and financial 
institutions, and to enhance the process of theory construction.  The paper argues that ideas and 
assumptions of change, learning, knowledge, social networks and power, are implicitly built into 
traditional finance theory. This shows the potential for connections between alternative ideas and finance 
theories. The change strategy for finance research and theory construction involves using a combination 
of: empirical and alternative theoretical narratives, to develop a ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’ 
(BTFF).  This is used to develop ‘conceptual connections’ to traditional finance theory of financial 
intermediation (FTFI). The combined ideas form a more comprehensive explanatory framework for banks 
and FIs. They provide means to address some of the problems identified with traditional finance theory,  
and to develop a strategy for active theory construction. 
    ‘Behaviour’ in the paper refers to actions by financial firm agents such as learning, creating knowledge 
and social resources, and mobilising these resources in organisations and market networks. It also refers to 
biases and risk taking behaviour by individuals in financial markets as expounded in Behavioural finance 
theories (Statman, 1999).  
         The paper explores how financial firms use social and knowledge resources to create information, 
control behaviour, and enhance decision conditions when exploiting financial resources. They mobilise 
intangible resources to reduce information asymmetry and transaction costs. They do this to enhance 
liquidity management, diversification, and risk management. This creates conditions for financial 
intermediation and hence the transformation of financial capital and its risks.  
      This is not an attempt to develop an integrated ‘meta’ theory. The aims are to position the ideas about 
Banks and FIs and empirical insights relative to alternative relevant literature, and demonstrate their 
collective power in interpreting the combined phenomena.  A modest aim is, to develop a ‘conversation’ 
between academics adopting different paradigms, relative to shared, common, empirical phenomena. 
‘Conceptual connections’ can provide the basis for connected ‘conversations’ and social interactions 
between many parties about theory based on different academic assumptions and views (paradigms) of the 
world (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Such a conversation is a critical ingredient in theory construction. 
        As a result, the paper constitutes an embryonic response to Gendron’s et al (2013) call for 
paradigmatic diversity in finance theory, and Colander’s et al (2009) call for ‘major reorientation in these 
(finance research) areas and a reconsideration of their basic premises’. The paper develops  a strategy to 
build a ‘house with windows’ by proposing new ways for finance theory to ‘take data from the outside 
world’ whilst continuously recognising ‘the complexities of the context’ (Keasey and Hudson, 2007). It 
therefore develops a stream of thought begun by Allen and Santomero (1998), and extended by Scholtens 
and van Wensveen (2003),  Keasey and Hudson (2007), and  Holland (2010).  
     The new approach can alter the intellectual assumptions on which regulatory actions are based (Turner, 
2009), and provide a new analytical tool for policy makers and regulators.  Regulators must broaden the 
focus of regulation and regulate change, learning, knowledge, culture, and not just regulate conduct 
concerning financial transactions. They must focus on knowledge and social resources, not just financial 
resources in banks and FIs. They must ‘stress test’ management knowledge, financial firm organisation, 
culture, as well as ‘financials’.  They must do this in an integrated and coherent way. 
          Section 1 discusses the use of, and problems with, traditional finance theory in the field of banks and 
FIs. Section 2 outlines a change strategy for research and building theory about banks and FIs and their 
agents. This forms a new basis for explaining banks and FIs and addressing problems. Section 3 develops an 
‘empirical narrative’ for banks and FIs based on field research. Section 4 outlines an embryonic ‘behavioural 
theory of the financial firm’. This is based on literature about: change and evolution, intellectual capital, 
management theory, theory of the firm, and sociology of finance literature; matched to empirical phenomena.  
In section 5, the ideas from the BTFF are ‘connected to’ specific finance theories of financial intermediation. 
BTFF and ‘connections’ to FTFI must have responsive, forward looking elements to create a robust 
conceptual framework for varying change conditions. If managers, regulators and academics wish to exploit 
FTFI they must be aware of such dynamics and not use a static version of FTFI by itself. Section 6 explores; 
how regulators and research councils can use such ideas to drive forward a new change strategy for research 
and theory construction, and outlines implications of the paper for regulation. Section 7 summarises the 
paper.  
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1. Traditional finance theory – content, uses and problems. 
 
This section of the paper discusses the nature and uses of traditional finance theory in the area of banks and 
financial institutions (FIs). It also explores two closely connected problems concerning explanatory power 
of finance theory for financial institutions (FTFI) for banks and FIs, and the way theory is constructed.  
   
    Buckle et al (2011) noted that a number of related theories are used to explain why and how financial 
intermediaries exist by reducing or solving market imperfections. These included theories of: asset 
transformation, transaction costs reduction, liquidity insurance, informational economies of scale, and 
delegated monitoring. These ideas about banks and FIs were supported by concepts of market efficiency, 
risk diversification, risk sharing and risk spreading. The latter ideas originated in equity markets. They 
were adopted for bank and FI balance sheets, and for financial transactions in markets (Lewis and Davies, 
1987). Traditional theory is very powerful in explaining economic processes in Banks/FIs and their 
banking and financial markets. It is especially important in explaining how risks arise with financial 
resources in banks and FIs and how they can be managed. This is what the theory was designed for, and its 
core elements (or structure, purpose and theory development method) are widely accepted. The theory and 
its level of abstraction and focus are particularly effective in periods of stability and gradual change 
affecting; the finance system, banks, other financial firms, financial products, customers and markets.   
 
The above theories overlap and compete when explaining the purely financial aspects of banks/FIs and 
financial intermediation. Each theory explains part, but not all, of bank or FI financial activities. They are 
theories of financial resources and their risks only, and normally ignore intangible resources and their risks 
in the financial firm.  Each theory focuses on and analyses parts of financial processes and activities in 
banks/FIs (eg liquidity management or deposit and loan transaction costs issues). In their analysis they 
assume other non financial processes and activities in banks/FI firms are constant (or ceteris paribus) or can 
be ignored. This perspective has historically been very successful in analysing parts of the financial 
intermediation process in depth.  
 
Problems in this theory perspective began to emerge in the 1990s in terms of: limited explanatory power, 
narrow focus, difficulty of implementation, and poor responsiveness to change.  For example, Scholtens 
and Wensveen (2003) argued that the neo classical view had insufficient explanatory power for banks and 
FIs. Contrary to established theory, the empirical evidence supported the view that banks and FI firms 
created and exploited imperfections in financial markets, and continued in existence through their own 
efforts. Traditional finance theory did not capture the need of Bank and FI firms to change, innovate and 
create new products as means to add value (Merton 1995; Scholtens et al, 2003).  
        The latter have been particularly important in the period 1980 to 2018 where much change and 
evolutionary processes occurred in banks and FIs.  From a traditional finance theory viewpoint, the role 
of changing knowledge, organisation form, and social structure in banks/FIs was to reduce agency costs, 
improve risk management and add value.  However, for banks and FIs the more dynamic aim was to 
create and use knowledge and social resources to develop new forms of value creation with financial 
resources. Continuing reduction (and in some cases increases) of agency costs and transaction costs was 
achieved as by-products of, evolutionary and strategic processes, and resulting changes in value creation 
purpose and activity (Scholtens and van Wensween (2003).  
 
In a similar vein Keasey and Hudson (2007) noted the problems of ignoring the wider contexts of finance, 
or of selectively choosing ‘facts’ from this world to support core ideas in theory.  
‘finance theory maintains both its momentum and hegemony… keeps itself artificially alive by taking data from the 
outside world, often ignoring the rich complexities of the context which has given rise to the data, and using these 
‘new facts’ to create puzzles which then lead onto more activity to see how the accepted core can or cannot be 
extended to incorporate the ‘new facts’ ‘ 
 
  Thus, traditional finance theories by themselves are inappropriate to explain the primary function, 
purpose, and behaviour of banks and FIs. They cannot explain the change process in banks and FIs in the 
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form of creation of new knowledge, and new social and market structures. They cannot explain: changing 
business models and value creation process, the emergence of new sources and uses of financial 
resources, and development of new financial products and new transacting means. They cannot explain 
how knowledge and social resources in the financial firm were mobilised to exploit financial resources.   
 
The GFC in 2007-09, demonstrated major limitations of traditional finance theory. Turner (2009) argued: 
‘…the crisis ..raises important questions about the intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches 
have largely been built…At the core of these assumptions has been the theory of efficient and rational markets. 
……these assumptions is now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical grounds’ 
 
The GFC highlighted limitations of established theory and reinforced views that change is required. 
Authors such as Colander et al (2009) and Gendron et al (2013) discussed how the crisis had exacerbated 
problems and stimulated the need for a new approach. Gendron et al (2013) argued that,  
‘the core of finance research has largely failed to invest in the promotion of paradigmatic diversity, and continues to 
resist the idea. Yet, the stakes involved are significant, since finance's lack of diversity in research paradigms arguably 
translates into a body of knowledge that presents important limitations when trying to make sense of important 
phenomena, not least of which are infrequent but highly significant events unfolding in the political economy’ 
 
The GFC also revealed major problems in bank/FI social networks and knowledge. The GFC showed how 
elite and operational agents in financial firms used their social networks and power to control the definition 
of what was knowledge and information, and influence private use of these resources in many kinds of 
financial firm transactions. As large and powerful ‘insiders’ in the networked world of finance, they 
mobilised their tangible and intangible resources to create superior and private information, and to generate 
wealth, relative to ‘outsiders’ as small savers and investors.  Misuse of power over intangibles and hence 
over information and transactions contributed to the GFC (Holland, 2010), and ongoing problems of public 
confidence in the finance sector.    
 
The GFC has reminded Banks and FIs that risk management is not a question of managing financial 
resources and their risks alone in a ‘basic’ model of financial intermediation. Top management in these 
financial firms have learnt that risks arise with their knowledge, social, and technology resources. The 
intangibles risks interact with and create risk in their financial resources (Kan, 2014). They have learnt they 
must ‘juggle’ or manage the combination of intangibles risks (knowledge, social relations), tangibles risks 
(technology), and financial risks together; in an ‘advanced’ model of financial intermediation (Holland, 
2010). Traditional finance theory does not deal with this critical area arising in ‘real world models’. 
 
Implicit role of change, IC, and relations in Traditional finance theory 
 
This paper, developing Keasey and Hudson (2007, argues that some ideas of learning (Allen et al 1998), 
specialised knowledge (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and capabilities (Scholtens et al 2003), information 
advantages, social networks and power are selectively ‘sampled’ by finance theorists in an ad hoc way 
from external contexts. They are implicitly and on occasion explicitly ‘built into’ traditional finance 
theories of banks and FIs.  This has been an established way of briefly introducing ‘real world’ insights to 
theory.  
   For example, traditional finance theory recognises the role of knowledge intensive intangible factors such 
as reputation and brands in economic processes in financial firms such as retail banks and investment banks 
(Scholtens et al 2003). Knowledge (as financial expertise) and ‘relationship’ social resources in banks/FIs 
are also assumed to be implicit in areas such as specialised assets, lending routines, credit scoring, or 
diversification of risks (Holland (1998, 2005, 2006). Knowledge and social resources are assumed to be 
part of: the organisation of branch networks and information systems, standardised products and contracts, 
tested procedures and routines, and information technology. Intangible resources and advantages are 
assumed to be present, but they are normally not made explicit, when developing arguments for traditional 
finance theories. 
  As a result, traditional finance theory for financial institutions (FTFI) does not explain what the intangible 
resources are, how they are acquired, or how they change. The ad hoc approach to ‘building in’ knowledge 
and social resources into traditional theories does not systematically capture many empirical insights about 
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intangible use in ‘real world’ models of Banks and FIs developed by authors such as Hellman, (2000, and 
Coleman, (2015).  Given a focus (on financial resources) and use of core assumptions (epistemological, 
ontological), the established finance theories are not based on a coherent integrated view of the full use of 
resources in the bank or FI. They do not seek to explain the connected role of many intangible resource 
factors: such as organisation, routines, social networks, reputation and power; in Banks/FI financial firms, 
and with their customers. They do not explain their roles in integrated business models, financial 
transactions, liquidity production, and financial intermediation. They do not explain how these intangible 
resources offset, contribute to, or exacerbate financial risks. They do not systematically explain the role of 
intangibles in the transformation of financial capital and its risks. This is despite knowledge intensive assets 
and capabilities being key to bank and FI specialism, competitive advantage and performance (Gendron 
and Smith-Lacroix, 2013); as well as being critical factors in bank/FI success and failure in the GFC 
(Holland, 2010).  
 
This paper argues that there is a need to connect broad ideas of financial firms in their social, knowledge 
and economic contexts, to ideas of financial transactions and financial intermediation. This requires 
connections between ideas about change, the role of intangibles and technology, and ideas about financial 
intermediation in banks/FIs. This reflects Scholtens et al (2003) idea that we should view ‘financial 
intermediaries from an evolutionary perspective’ and we should develop theory about financial institutions 
conducting financial intermediation services rather than about financial intermediation per se. 
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2. A change strategy - creating a ‘house with windows’      
This section explores how a theory construction and change strategy can form a new basis for explaining 
and understanding banks and FIs and address some of the problems of finance theory. The above can be 
interpreted as developing a change strategy to build a ‘house with windows’ (Keasey and Hudson, 2007) in 
the fields of practice and academe in finance. 
 
The first part of the change strategy involves developing an embryonic ‘behavioural theory of the financial 
firm’ based on empirical and theoretical narratives (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007). The second part 
involves the search for potential conceptual ‘connections’ between alternative ideas of the financial firm,  
and traditional finance theory ideas (Buckle et al, 2011).  
 
The empirical narrative is derived from field work on, business models in case banks and FIs, and their 
relationship with financial intermediation and risk management.  It shows how social structures and 
knowledge interact with finance resource factors and processes in banks and FIs. The narrative also 
illustrates change and learning processes, knowledge creation, and developing new forms of financial 
firms. The active use of field research proposed in this paper reflects Gendron’s at al (2013) call for an 
academic ‘commitment to research diversity and engage more thoroughly in the examination of finance in 
action’.     
 
Alternative theory is used to interpret and explain the empirical narrative and develop an embryonic 
‘behavioural theory of the financial firm’. This is based on Theory of the firm such as Cyert and March 
(1963), Barney (1991), and ‘Behavioural finance’ theory (Statman, 1999).These sources are explicitly 
linked to literature on: Learning organisations, social contexts, intellectual capital, business models, and 
value creation of financial firms (Holland, 2016). Change theory such as Merton (1995) and Scholtens et al 
(2003) adds a dynamic element to the explanations. 
 
The above is based on an emerging programme of field and qualitative research in finance which focuses 
on understanding how financial firms function and exploit expert knowledge in social and economic 
contexts. This includes Holland (1994), Hellman (1996), Holland and Doran (1998), Holland et al (2012), 
Lord (2014, Chen et al (2014), Coleman (2015), Holland (2016).  In this approach social context and 
expert knowledge in financial firms, are explicitly recognised as key elements in financial decisions and 
financial risk management: at transaction, portfolio and firm levels in banks/FIs; and hence in transforming 
financial capital and its risks. 
 
This approach differs to proposals by Allen et al (1998) and Scholtens et al (2003) to adapt theory of 
financial intermediaries. Scholtens et al (2003) proposed new ideas within the conventional finance 
paradigm and sought to ‘look out’ to alternative theory sources for new ideas or assumptions to ‘build into’ 
and adapt finance theory. There are limits to this approach given the assumptions (ontological, 
epistemological) and financial resource focus of finance theory. There are limits to ‘squeezing’ ideas about 
social and knowledge resources in the financial firm into a finance theory framework not designed to look 
at these matters (Keasey and Hudson, 2007).  
 
    The approach does not seek to ‘integrate’ traditional finance theory with empirical narrative and 
alternative theory perspectives. There are too many epistemological and ontological differences (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980) between the assumptions of positivism in traditional finance theory and the 
assumptions of say symbolic and contextual analysis underlying sociology and management theoretical 
sources.  It is not feasible to ‘build in’ a set of ideas of the financial firm and it knowledge and social 
resources into a larger theory of finance. However the paper demonstrates that there are other ways of 
potentially ‘connecting’ and combining these theory sources without seeking to develop a ‘meta theory’.   
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               3. Developing an empirical narrative  
 
In this section ‘field based stories’ or ‘empirical narratives’ (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007) are 
developed for empirical findings about connected financial, social and knowledge based processes of banks 
and FIs. Gendron et al (2013) define investigating finance in action within context as;  
‘…comprise the questioning of formal and rationalized accounts of practice, and the studying of the complex backstage of practice 
in its socio-organizational context. The dynamics of the work of finance practitioners and financial institutions and how it changes 
over time will also be considered’ 
In this paper ‘formal and rationalized accounts of practice’ concern, knowledge intensive business models 
in bank and FI financial firms, and their relationship with financial intermediation and risk management. 
The ‘studying of the complex backstage of practice in its socio-organizational context’ involves analysis of 
how social structures and knowledge were mobilised by banks/FIs to interact with financial resources and 
financial decision processes in financial markets. This also includes change and learning processes, and the 
creation of knowledge and resources in new advanced forms of financial firms. These collectively form the 
basis for developing an explicit empirical narrative.  
The role of knowledge based intangibles and social context in intermediation  
       Field based research illustrates the role of knowledge based intangibles and social contexts in bank and 
FI intermediation processes. Examples of the field studies include: Holland’s (2006, 2016)  research into  
fund manager firms,  Chen et al, (2014) study of banking firms, Holland et al (2012) research into venture 
capital firms, and Chen et al’s (2016) study of  financial analysts in investment research firms. The GFC 
also revealed the central role of (failing) knowledge based intangibles and social contexts in banks 
(Holland, 2010).   The field studies and GFC events are used to construct the empirical narrative. 
       The field studies were used to explain each specialist type of financial firm as a ‘grounded theory’ 
(Locke 2001). They show the central role of many connected knowledge and social (intangibles) resources 
in financial and information intermediation processes in Banks and FIs. Each financial firm had a unique 
combination of resources, integrated in a business model and driven by strategy and profit aims (IIRC, 
2013). This was intended to create a unique and sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) (Barney, 1991) 
for each firm. It was intended to create special expertise (Merton, 1995) for use in information production, 
transacting and risk management; and hence in transformation of financial capital and its risks. Management 
mobilised combined resources and perceived advantages to enhance financial transacting and intermediation 
processes in the expectation that this would lead to competitive success. However, the GFC revealed that 
such intentions and perceptions were illusory. This suggests that the literature on sustainable advantage should 
also focus on such cases where competitive disadvantages were created leading to major problems and 
failure.   
        Knowledge resources included intellectual capital (IC) (Meritum, 2002) about financial firms and 
capabilities of teams and individuals. They comprised understanding of: organisation, hierarchy, process, 
culture, routines, and teams; within financial firms. They included knowledge of: external social networks 
and relations, power and processes; that banks and FIs have with customers and market participants. They 
involved knowledge of financial needs of customers, of financial transactions, and of banking and financial 
markets. They comprised financial expertise (Preda, 2005) or understanding of pricing mechanisms in 
financial markets and the role of intangibles such as brand, reputation, and customer relations in supporting 
transactions in these markets. They included knowledge of financial intermediation and risk management at 
financial portfolio (asset, liability) and financial firm level (Lewis and Davies,1987). 
         The field studies also revealed how various social contexts and resources in the bank/FI and its 
external world were central to bank/FI economic processes.  Within the firm, social factors involved areas 
such as organisation hierarchy and power (Stein, 2002), organisational culture (Schein, 1989), and 
organisational process (Cyert and March, 1963). Banks / FIs used collective organisation resources to 
disseminate information, influence desired behaviour, and control risk taking.   Banks/FIs also operated in 
external networks of social and economic relations. The networks existed on both supply side for funds, 
and demand side for provision of financial services (Holland, 1994).  
Page 7 of 26 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Regulation and Com
pliance8 
 
 
Use of social and knowledge resources in intermediation 
Each Bank/FI as a financial intermediary used knowledge and social resources to create information and 
control behaviour. This was the basis to transform financial (asset and liability) capital and risks and to 
achieve a profit. These processes occurred within the bank/FI firm as well as its specialist financial markets 
and associated social networks. 
     Social networks in financial markets supported information search and exchange with customers, clients 
regulators and others. Information about customers or clients as financial resource users and suppliers was 
acquired during transaction activity in the networks. It was processed and analysed by bank/FI agents 
within their financial firm contexts (Holland, 2006; Chen et al 2014).   These information production 
activities in social networks were core parts of the financial firm’s ability to intermediate funds and 
financial services between different resource suppliers and users. Regular and effective transacting in 
market networks was key means to maintain confidence in the firm and build its reputation. Information 
was exchanged with regulators about these financial transaction and financial intermediation activities to 
assure regulators that ‘good practice’ and mandatory requirements were satisfied, and thus maintain 
confidence in the financial firm in market social networks. 
      Social network factors: such as power, good reputation and quality brands, relative to external clients, 
customers, suppliers, and regulators; were used in market social networks and expected to increase 
financial transaction success and confidence in the firm.  Firm agent (top management, front office) 
knowledge of social networks in markets and of expected behaviour of external agents  (customers, 
competitors, regulators) was important in the control of risky behaviour and transacting and in reducing 
decision costs for bank/FI agents on both fund supply and financial service demand sides.  Agent 
knowledge of, and power in, financial firm social contexts (internal and external), were key to creating and 
using new information – both soft and hard – in specialist intermediation processes  (for example in retail 
banks in Chen et al 2014; or  fund managers, Holland, 2016). These social resource factors could, at times, 
be the means to manipulate and bias information flows to weaken competitors and exploit and perhaps 
defraud clients and customers (Holland, 2010).  Such potential misuse use of social and knowledge 
resources should be the focus of attention of regulators as much as the eventual financial transaction and 
portfolio outcomes. 
    
Change and bank/FI learning and knowledge creation 
The empirical narrative can be extended by using field research about bank/FI response to change.    
Research by authors such as: Harris (2002), Antonacopoulou (2006),  Shih et al (2010), Holland (2010), 
Holland et al (2012), Chahal et al (2015);  illustrate how banks and other financial institutions respond to 
change, learn, and create knowledge based intangibles relevant to effective functioning of the financial 
firm. Top management and front office staff in financial intermediaries (banks and FIs) learnt over time 
how to create knowledge embodied in new products, and to overcome, and at times create, market 
imperfections. The idea that banks and FIs exist because of imperfections has been countered by the idea 
that imperfections exist and persist because of value seeking banks and FIs (Scholtens et al, 2003).   The 
creation of imperfections and power over transacting is considered to be legal and amoral by agents in 
financial firms (Luyendijk, 2016). When driven by greed their actions have mutated into immorality and 
illegality as in mis-selling and Libor cases. 
Studies by Harris (2002), Antonacopoulou (2006) and Holland et al (2012), provide insights into learning 
about the financial firm. Top management and front office staff learnt how to develop: bank or FI 
organisation and hierarchy (structural capital), the skills and capabilities of their teams and individuals 
(human capital), and their relationships, brands and reputation with customers and other external agents 
(relational capital).  Bank/FI learning over time created special knowledge in ‘front office’ teams about 
customer behaviour in markets and social settings, and in ‘back office’ teams about administering 
transactions, monitoring performance and risk. Bank/FI learning over time created special knowledge in top 
management teams about asset and liability portfolios and how to manage bank/FI firm wide risks. Learning 
created specialist knowledge about decision routines, teams and individual skills. Such processes occurred in 
banks and other FIs such as pension funds, insurance companies, and fund managers. 
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  Agents in financial firms sought to create knowledge about their customers (Holland et al, 2012). They tried 
to understand their roles as banks and FIs in the social ‘network’ value creation process with their finance 
suppliers and users, and the role of bank/FI intangibles (reputation, brands) and tangibles in supporting this 
economic process. For example, retail banks sought special insights into savings, spending and borrowing 
behaviour by customers and by others in the retail banking market (Chen et al, 2014). This knowledge was 
the means to create special and private information about customers, and close economic ‘relationships’. 
These formed key parts of the competitive advantage for the retail bank. 
      Banks and FIs also sought to learn how risks arose in social situations, in knowledge assets and 
technology. Risks have arisen in social situations when problems occurred in internal financial firm culture 
and governance, external community relations, and customer relations (Sen, 2015).  Before the GFC risks 
arose in knowledge assets when: top management did not understand changes in markets and in the 
business model of the financial firm; and ‘front line’ staff did not understand changing customer needs and 
behaviour (Holland, 2010). Major risks arise from technological change and emergence of innovations in 
social media. For example, the combination of technology and social media, can quickly magnify problems 
with existing financial liabilities and assets, and erode trust and confidence in the bank (Culp, 2014).  
 
     Sen  (2015), noted how Samuel Tsien as Chief executive of OCBC bank in Singapore compared the  
running of bank to being a ‘juggler’ of many financial and intangible risks for profit. These included 
managing risks: associated with bank social and reputation capital, organisational capital, human capital 
(Meritum, 2002), and with regulators; as well as their combined impact on risks of financial capital. Tsien, 
(in Sen, 2015),said: 
“bankers today not only have to meet expectations of ..stakeholders in delivery of services and in results, they must also pay attention 
to the increasingly-strident demands of communities, citizens and politicians. ….have to reshape the bank's organisational culture to 
meet the highest demands of trust, honesty and integrity, fair dealing, corporate governance and social responsibility….Because.. of 
jump in ..regulations since  2008 GFC compliance costs have increased.  …these costs cannot be passed on to customers, 
shareholders  get  reduced returns,  …..Further, with pervasive multiplier effect of social media these days, banks are exposed to 
much higher reputational risks  ….What starts off as a blip that could dent a bank's reputation can quickly escalate into a full-blown 
crisis, with enormous financial and regulatory impacts…..This is not easy, only a smart juggler can do it.“          
 
Problems in learning and knowledge creation 
        Major events such as the GFC in 2007-08 showed how learning about interactions between intangible 
and financial resource factors can go wrong and banks/FIs and markets can fail.  In 2000-06 before the GFC, 
major (combinations of) of Bank/FI problems arose over time in intangibles such as: the quality of top 
management, their incentive schemes, their understanding of new risky bank models, and their ability to 
learn about change (Holland, 2010).  This led to high exposure to financial risk, and increases in risk taking. 
When these negative conditions coincided with major adverse events (economic, political etc) in 2007-08, 
they led to bank firm failure and banking market problems. Failure arose with knowledge based intangibles 
such as experience based financial expertise in Banks/FIs in top management and front office staff (Holland, 
2010). Failure arose with a misplaced trust in established finance theory when it was used as an ideology 
rather than tested ideas. Beliefs that efficient markets could value complex instruments (with valuation based 
on finance theory) were found to be in error (Turner, 2009). These created further problems with the 
transformation of financial resources and their risk in financial intermediation processes.  
     In the post GFC period, rapid change and new problems have emerged with increased regulatory 
requirement, global internet usage, digitalisation of financial services, and risks of digital disruption. Tsien 
(2014) in Kan (2014) argues that:  
‘Bankers, therefore, must be skilled in managing complexity. This in turn requires an intimate knowledge of many fast-changing 
facets of today’s world... Bankers need to understand the inter-connectivity between financial markets and economies, the speed and 
ease with which capital and investment funds flow and information gets distributed, and the rise of social media and alternative 
payment providers, along with the systemic risks that come along with them.’ 
    The above highlights the need to use the above ideas to develop ongoing diagnosis of: change, 
‘innovation’, and new regulation post GFC. Financial firms must identify emerging problems with 
knowledge based intangibles, social resources and technology, before they adversely affect the core financial 
intermediation processes and risks. 
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4. Developing a ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’ (BTFF) 
This section investigates how an alternative ‘theoretical narrative’ can be used to interpret and explain the 
‘empirical narrative’. The theoretical narrative and its interpretation of the empirical narrative are presented 
as an embryonic ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’. The alternative theory view is based on (non 
finance theory) literature about: change and evolution, learning organisations, intellectual capital, theory of 
the firm, behavioural finance, and sociology of finance; matched to the empirical phenomena. The literature 
has been chosen for its relevance to the empirical narrative and from comments during presentations.  
 
The ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’ is briefly outlined as follows. 
        
The field studies illustrated how in a world of change, learning and adaptation by top management and other 
agents of bank and FI firms, led to new knowledge and capabilities in bank and FI teams. This is interpreted 
as top management in ‘Learning organisations’ (Pedler et al 1997) gaining knowledge to strategically 
allocate capital (financial and intangible) to create an effective organization. They created a financial firm 
with a unique combination of resources, both intangible and tangible. ‘Behaviour’ in this paper refers to 
actions such as learning, and mobilisation of resources, in organisations and social networks (Cyert and 
March, 1963); as well as the ideas from behavioural finance theories (Statman, 1999). 
 
      Board and Top management teams directed strategy, and developed mechanisms to mould and transmit 
the chosen philosophy, culture, incentives and risk management ethos of the firm. They decided on the 
nature of internal resources such as knowledge, organisation and hierarchy, organisational processes, 
routines, technology and financial reserves.  The internal resources were strategically matched to the external 
environment (customer needs, social networks, market conditions, competition, and technology change) but 
also changed with learning and circumstances (Teece et al, 1997). The intangible and tangible resources were 
designed to create a sustainable competitive advantage unique to each financial firm. This was based on a 
unique, difficult to copy, combination of resources, both tangible and intangible as noted in the ‘Resource 
based view of firm’ (Barney, 1991). 
    The combination of knowledge intensive intangibles and tangibles were integrated in bank/FI business 
models and value creation chains (IIRC, 2013) and expected to be the basis for winners and losers to emerge 
in banks and specialist FIs. The resources and their advantages were mobilised to maximise the financial 
benefits from financial resources during financial transactions and intermediation. They were designed to 
create superior ability to overcome problems of information, behavior, and risk management; and to enhance 
the production and sale of Bank/FI products and services. They were developed to control behavior in the 
firm, market social networks, and markets. They were intended to create: superior information collection and 
evaluation capabilities in decision teams, about transactions, and about portfolios of transactions; and to 
enhance liquidity and create the conditions for the transformation of financial capital and its risks. They were 
designed to: make financial intermediation possible, to differentiate Bank/FIs, and to make them 
competitive.  
   
The resulting financial firms can be interpreted as evolutionary (Nelson & Winter 1982) responses to 
uncertainty. Their organisation structures, resource use processes, intermediation processes, external social 
networks, and shared firm wide knowledge; were developed by their top management and other agents in a 
common institutional and market setting (Scott and Meyer, 1994; Scott, 2001).  
       
Mobilising combined resources to control combined risks 
The brief theoretical narrative can be expanded by exploring the role of combined knowledge (intellectual 
capital) and social resources in more detail (Holland, 2017). From a bank/FI management perspective the 
combined knowledge and social resources were integrated means to cope with risks associated with financial 
resources.  They were the means to reduce and exploit information and behaviour problems with financial 
resources at transaction and portfolio levels. They were means to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
financial asset, liability and risk management decisions (Hellman, p236, 2000). When resources were 
combined and mobilised in coherent ways, they were important organisational means for uncertainty 
avoidance and conflict resolution, in the manner suggested by Cyert and March (1963).  They were the 
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means to create information advantages and influence over customers, reduce decision costs (Stein, 2002) 
and to lower the costs of transacting.  
    As noted in section 3, banks and FIs learnt how risk occurred with combined intangible and financial 
resources (Holland, 2010; Culp, 2014; Sen, 2015).  The risks of intangibles and tangibles interact and can 
have a negative effect on the supply of funds, financial performance of assets, and liquidity of both liabilities 
and assets.  They can have negative effects on transaction cost, liquidity, and financial intermediation. The 
complex ‘juggling’ of many different tangibles, intangibles, and financial resources; their combined risks and 
benefits; requires a coherent strategy and comprehensive idea of the bank or FI business model. The 
‘behavioural theory of the financial firm’ seeks to make these issues explicit. 
 
Change, and Merton’s spiral. 
The ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’, can be further developed using Merton’s (1995) theoretical 
ideas on how change occurred in banks, FIs and the financial system. Merton and Bodie (2005) argued in 
their theory of ‘functional and structural finance’ (FSF) that economic functions of the financial system 
were stable ‘anchors’ or ‘givens’ and environmental changes stimulated bank and FI learning and 
evolution towards satisfying these functions. Thus the mechanisms of environmental change, 
organisational learning (Pedler et al,1997), competitive pressures and strategic choice (Teece et al, 1997), 
can be interpreted as primary means by which  financial firms evolved over time (Nelson & Winter 1982) 
in a common institutional setting (Scott, 2001) in the direction of Merton and Bodie’s (2005) economic 
functions of the financial system.  
       The dynamic change in economic processes observed over time in case Banks and FIs and active 
learning were examples of Merton’s ‘financial innovation spiral’ (1995). This was where key bank and FI 
intangible resource elements such as: business models, value creation chains, and relative competitive 
positions in markets; evolved together over time. At the same time financial resource elements such as: 
the forms of financial and information intermediation, associated financial and information products, 
related risk management services, product users and their needs, and the wider market for these bank and 
FI products; evolved together over time.  
       Bank/FI learning at team and individual levels: created new knowledge as human, structural, and 
relational capital (Meritum, 2002); concerning all of the evolved elements and hence evolution of the firm 
with integrated intangible and financial resources. This knowledge informed bank/FI decisions about 
changes in these elements. The above reflects Scholtens et al (2003) view that understanding the 
evolution of financial institutions conducting financial intermediation should be the focus of research 
rather than financial intermediation per se. 
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5. Exploring the potential for conceptual ‘connections’.  
 
           This section explores the potential for conceptual ‘connections’ between BTFF and each specialised 
theory of financial intermediation. Initially, it assumes stable or gradual change conditions for the influence 
of intangibles on financial resources. It subsequently explores how rapid change and uncertainty conditions 
create problematic conditions for use of finance theory (FTFI) and financial expertise, hence contributing to 
problems for managers, regulators, and academics.   
 
Thus the BTTF and ‘connections’ to FTFI must have responsive, forward looking elements to ensure a 
robust conceptual framework is created for varying conditions. Financial firms have to respond to varying 
change conditions and to formally manage their learning. They can use the BTFF to support contingency 
planning and early warning systems by designing robust intangibles to support financial resource use in 
range of circumstances.  They can use this to continuously respond to, create and exploit market 
imperfections (Scholtens and van Wensween, 2003) or new versions of the information, transactions cost and 
behaviour conditions assumed in FTFI. If managers, regulators and academics wish to exploit FTFI in a 
changing world they must be aware of dynamic conceptual connections between BTFF and FTFI and not use 
a static version of FTFI by itself. 
 
 
What are the proposed ‘conceptual connections’? 
 
The conceptual connections are developed by relating concepts in the ‘Behavioral theory of the financial 
firm’ to concepts in the ‘finance theories of financial intermediation’ (FTFI). They include connections 
between BTFF concepts such as: knowledge, organisation, social networks, and the mobilisation of these 
resources; and FTFI concepts such as: information asymmetry in financial resources, transaction costs, 
liquidity management, diversification, risk management and financial intermediation.  
 
The BTFF and ‘connections’ reflect ‘integrated thinking’ (IIRC, 2013) concerning how the creation and 
mobilisation of intangible resources produced supportive information and behaviour circumstances when 
conducting financial transactions and managing financial risk. Financial firms mobilised intangibles to 
produce and exploit specialist information, create trust, and influence the behaviour of customers and their 
own agents concerning financial resources. These enhanced bank/FI agent decision conditions when 
exploiting financial resources. 
 
In FTFI terms they mobilised intangible resources to reduce (and sometimes increase) information 
asymmetry and transaction costs. They did this to enhance liquidity management, diversification, and risk 
management. These produced suitable circumstances for: financial transacting and risk management at the 
level of individual transactions, portfolios and the financial firm; and for financial intermediation or 
transformation of financial resources and its risks.   
 
The BTFF shows how special combinations of knowledge and social intangibles are the underlying basis for 
assumptions in each finance theory of financial intermediation such as delegated monitoring. The BTFF is 
used to explore the use of intangibles and information and behavior conditions in each theory. The common 
and special use of intangibles relative to FTFI theories reveals new connections between the theories, and 
offer new potential routes for integrating theories. The above also illustrates how connected BTFF and FTFI 
theories form a more comprehensive explanatory framework for banks and FIs; than the FTFI set of theories 
alone. 
 
Examples of broad conceptual connections can be made explicit as follows.  Heffernan (2005) related the 
ideas of organisation, monitoring, contracting, and incentives structures to the rationale for the financial firm 
relative to markets.  
‘… core functions of a bank are more efficiently carried out by a command organisational structure, because loans and deposits are internal to a bank. 
Such a structure is also efficient if banks are participating in organised markets. These ideas were developed … by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who 
emphasised the monitoring role of the firm and its creation of incentive structures. Williamson (1981) argued that under conditions of uncertainty, a 
firm could economise on the costs of outside contracts’ 
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(Heffernan, 2005, P xiii) also noted a problem 
‘Unfortunately, the structure itself creates principal–agent problems, between depositor and bank, shareholders and management, the bank and its 
employees, and the bank and its borrowers. Differences in information between principal and agent give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Relationship and transactional banking can, in different ways, help to minimise these problems in a bank–client relationship’ 
 
    In the BTFF, internal based intangibles: such as organisation structure, organisational control, employment 
contracts and incentive schemes; were designed to reduce information and behavioural problems and hence 
principal–agent problems, between bank/FI board and top management teams, and between them and middle 
management and front line employees (Heffernan, 2005)  
       In addition various market oriented organisational structures and functions in the financial firm, and 
customer facing intangibles in the financial firm, were designed to control information and behavioural 
problems; and hence principal–agent problems with external agents. The latter included problems between 
banks/FIs front line agents, fund users and suppliers, and between bank/FI board and top management teams 
and equity fund suppliers.  
     For example, Holland (2010) noted how large banks when forming universal banks in the 1980s 
reorganized ‘their new internal functions around financial and corporate/consumer markets to create a market 
driven and responsive organization’. Chen et al (2014) showed how customer facing intangibles; and fund 
supplier facing intangibles were designed to control such problems and maximise benefits. The customer 
facing intangibles included brand and reputation, contracts and incentive schemes, and socio-economic 
relations. ‘Control’ could mean reduced information asymmetry and transaction costs for the financial firm, 
but not necessarily at the same level for the customer. The latter gained the benefits of transactions and 
services not fully available to it in open markets.   
 
Dynamic conceptual connections between BTFF and FTFI ideas can be made explicit as follows. The 
combination of: market aligned bank/FI functions, customer and fund supplier social networks, and 
successful transacting over time; was the basis for, financial firms and customers to learn together and jointly 
develop shared intangibles such as ‘relations’,  trust and reputation. These in turn created conditions for 
further financial transacting, liquidity creation, and transformation of financial capital and its risks. 
Continued maintenance of such intangibles created incentives for both parties to complete ongoing financial 
transactions and to engage in future transactions. These dynamic interactions were the basis for financial 
firms to continue to control information asymmetry and transaction costs between them and customers, 
making ‘relationship’ financial transacting possible.  If ‘relationship’ learning was not possible, and private 
information could not be accumulated over time from customers, then financial firms such as banks turned to 
‘arms length’ transacting using public information, or refused to transact (Holland, 1994). 
 
           Thus concepts and variables in BTFF were ‘connected’ to variables in FTFI and dynamic interactions 
between the ideas were made explicit. Supportive (or negative) conditions in a set of variables in BTFF (in 
resources and their mobilisation); were ‘connected to’ supportive (or negative) information production 
conditions and expected agent behaviours in FTFI; with this leading to decisions and transactions. There was 
a strong dynamic element to the connections. The direction and scale of change in one set of variables in the 
BTFF were ‘connected to’ equivalent change in variables in FTFI. Ideas of positive (or negative) changes, 
and of mutual reciprocal interactions in social, knowledge and financial resource factors; were ‘connected to’ 
ideas of, learning (or not learning); and to financial innovation (or producing useless and risky products). 
These were connected to positive and negative changes in information asymmetry and transaction costs; and 
to changes in financial decisions in financial firms (increase or reduce risk for required return).  These in turn 
were connected to positive and negative changes in financial transacting, delegated monitoring, liquidity 
production, and asset transformation. 
    
          As a result, this section provides examples of how an alternative theory narrative in the form of BTFF 
can be connected to the traditional finance theory view of financial intermediation (FTFI). At this embryonic 
stage, ‘connection’ refers to likely links and inferences rather than formal logical links or empirically tested 
associations. This approach provides a tentative first step in exploring how to overcome some of the 
problems faced in using traditional finance theory alone, whilst exploiting the potential of finance theory for 
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key parts of the explanation in periods of stability and change. However, it should be noted that: 
epistemological and ontological differences in theory assumptions, core tenets, views of the world, and 
research methodologies; create barriers between theories.  They create barriers to integration of traditional 
finance theory of financial intermediation, and the theories underlying the BTFF (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980). Hence this paper is not an attempt to develop an integrated ‘meta’ theory. It seeks to position the ideas 
and empirical insights about financial firms relative to relevant literature, and demonstrate their collective 
power in the form of ‘connected’ BTFF and FTFI in interpreting the combined phenomena. The aim is to 
show how these combined ideas can enhance explanatory power of theory.   
 
5.1 Transaction costs, asymmetric information, economies of scale and scope 
 
Buckle et al (2011) note that the core reason for financial intermediation is the existence of transaction costs. 
Financial firms reduce search transaction costs through use of branches and other direct forms of customer 
contact. They reduce costs of assessing financial transactions by supplying standard products, and reduce 
contracting and monitoring costs by use of specialised contracts and tested decision routines. The BTFF 
develops these ideas by arguing that transaction cost reduction was also based on Bank/FI intangibles and 
strengths with these learnt, developed and mobilised over time.  
 
In the BTFF, the combination of market aligned bank/FI functions, customer and fund supplier social 
networks, and successful transacting over time; is the basis for financial firms and customers to jointly 
develop shared intangibles such as relations, trust and reputation.  They were the basis for the financial firm 
to generate expert knowledge (Preda, 2005) or financial expertise about valuation models, standard 
transactions, products, and contracting. They were the basis to develop individual capabilities of front line 
staff dealing with customers, and knowledge of how to use relationships with customers in their market 
segments. These resources provided means to produce information, control and direct agent behaviour in the 
firm, reduce information asymmetries, and to influence customer behaviour. 
 
Active mobilisation of these intangible resources reduced the time and money spent in performing individual 
financial transactions and hence reduced unit transaction costs (of search/screen, monitor, contracting, 
Dahlman, 1979) for the financial firm with customers. This potentially, but not necessarily, reduced the same 
problems for customers. When repeated across a large volume of many similar transactions this was the basis 
for economies of scale and hence for low (unit) cost transacting and risk management in the financial firm.  
 
Knowledge and social resources were also the means to produce a variety of financial services from a 
common resource base. The use of shared resources lowered costs for each product and achieved economies 
of scope.   In contrast when products and services were newly created, banks and FI faced weak competition, 
and mobilised knowledge and social relations to exploit large margins. This could create imperfections in 
markets and increase transaction costs for customers as the bank/FI sought to exploits it monopoly over 
knowledge, information and products. 
 
As a result, the creation and mobilisation of firm wide resources were means to control transaction costs for 
bank/FI benefits (Benston and Smith, 1976), and reduce bank/FI problems arising out of asymmetric 
information (Akerlof, 1970; Leland and Pyle, 1977), for individual transactions and for all major classes of 
assets and liabilities in Bank/FI portfolios.   
 
It should be noted that problems with knowledge and capabilities have been the basis for knowledge and 
social risks, which created information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard problems. These 
increased transaction costs and contributed to financial risks. During the GFC this included problems with 
knowledge of: organisation structure and control processes, behaviour (in the firm, and in customer 
networks); incentives; and with financial expertise.  Flawed decision capabilities and amoral (sometimes 
immoral) behaviour (Luyendijk, 2016) contributed to mis-selling problems with mortgages, and payment 
protection insurance in retail banking, leading to major financial penalties levied on banks and FIs.    
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5.2 Delegated monitoring                       
 
Diamond, (1984) argues that customers, supplying funds to bank/FIs, delegated the monitoring of their funds 
to a specialist financial intermediary. The BTFF develops these ideas by arguing that delegated monitoring 
was based on observable and partially observable Bank/FI intangibles and strengths, with these learnt, 
developed and mobilised over time. Rapid change can reduce the explanatory power of delegated monitoring 
theory.   
 
In the BTFF, financial firms and customers learned together and jointly developed shared and observable 
intangibles such as ‘relations’, trust and reputation over time.  Customers were in a position to partially 
observe or infer that banks and FIs developed special financial expertise, information sources, skills of front 
line staff, and access to markets. Unobservable advantages of bank and FIs included organisational structure, 
culture, controls over risk, knowledge intensive routines, specialised contracts, access to markets and other 
intangibles. 
 
Individual customers were unlikely to be able to replicate these bank/FI advantages except at high cost. 
Customers were in a position to recognise that some financial firms had competitive advantages in 
innovation, product quality and market access compared to other competitors. Historic proxies such as: 
quality of products, transaction success, customer satisfaction, reputation, brand, and financial 
performance; provided substitute information for customers to infer the quality of these unobservable 
intangibles, and created positive conditions for future transacting.  
 
Learning, special capabilities and customer relationships helped bank/FI front line staff to continue to reduce 
information asymmetry problems with customers  before, during and after transacting, and thus reduced 
(moral hazard and adverse selection)  behaviour problems for banks/FIs.   As a result banks and FIs had 
knowledge and social advantages over customers in contracting, monitoring and renegotiating assets such as 
loans; and in reducing the costs of these activities (Holland, 1994). They also knew how to use portfolios 
(large number transactions, many segment) to diversify the risk of assets such as loans.  
 
The paper argues that combinations of: shared and observable financial firm-customer intangibles; partially 
observable  Bank/FI capabilities; and unobservable advantages and their proxies; was a basis for delegated 
monitoring. Individuals could not develop the special bank/FI advantages, but could use their observation 
(or assumption) of these advantages, as well as experience of  transactions, relations and trust; to have 
confidence in transactions with bank/FIs. As a result customers, supplying funds to bank/FIs, delegated the 
monitoring of their savings, funding, or financial service transaction to a specialist financial intermediary 
(Diamond, 1984).  Depositor or saver confidence in the reputation of banks or FIs was also buttressed by 
government insurance schemes (eg for deposits) and by financial firm regulation (Sinkey, 1989, p, 489-490). 
Holland (1994) notes how many connected intangibles such as access to information, relationships, and 
reputation, played a central role in ‘delegated monitoring’ 
‘The reputational capital of the bank … depends on its access to information… this information can be acquired by the bank because 
its joint production of depository, payment, loan and … other financial services for the client, generates many complementary types 
of information. Relationship banking can be seen as a further means to broaden this information base and can be interpreted as one 
means by which a bank can enhance its credibility as a delegated monitor. Under these conditions depositors more likely to transfer 
(delegate) their agency  problem and their deposits to the bank’. 
 
The bank/FI competitive advantages acquired by learning did not exist relative to all customers. A loss of 
advantage occurred when large corporate customers imitated bank/FI learning, and created their own 
intangibles in corporate treasuries (eg BP). They reduced their transaction costs, changed their behaviour and 
directly transacted in markets as savers/investors and borrowers. Large commercial firms (as potential 
customers) bypassed bank financial intermediation processes and raised funds and invested surplus cash 
directly in markets (Lewis and Davies, 1987). This occurred when large firms had established reputations for 
repaying debt, low perceived risk, and high expected profits. It occurred when they were transacting in well 
known financial services, and operated in information rich world concerning these matters. For example, 
these factors lowered information asymmetry and transaction costs with direct purchasers of company debt 
securities. Large firms could independently learn and develop the combination of shared intangibles such as 
‘relations’, market access, trust and reputation, directly with suppliers of funds. They could develop their 
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own financial expertise, information sources and capabilities, concerning transactions such as bond issues. 
Bank/FIs had to match and exceed such learning with corporate customers to maintain a share of the 
corporate market. 
 
Firms without these capabilities, had to become bank or FI  customers. For example, they had to use banks 
for loans; and rely on delegated monitoring (of deposits) for banks to fund the loans.  Banks and FIs 
therefore learnt how to develop a combination of superior fund raising capabilities and superior intangibles 
compared to such firms. The advantages provided the means for bank/FIs to reduce information asymmetry 
and transaction costs relative to firms and direct transacting in markets. As a result, delegated monitoring  
was based on strengths of combinations of tangibles, intangibles and behaviours developed and learnt over 
time.  
 
Delegated monitoring, rapid change and problems. 
 
Bank/FI advantages were continuously subject to erosion especially in period of rapid change. This was not 
just problems of customers from large firms. Technology created opportunities for retail savers and investors 
to learn and acquire advantages relative to banks and FIs and to reduce their reliance on delegated 
monitoring. For example, bank advantages and delegated monitoring by customers, faced serious challenges 
from the rise of ‘disruptive technology’ (Kan, 2014) such as combinations of social media, ‘smart phones’ 
and internet. These radically reduced the transaction costs of direct financing between individuals and 
companies.   
     Banks had to be proactive and learn about changes in expected customer behaviour in digital social 
networks and their impact on bank functions and bank agent behaviour. They had to use sophisticated 
analysis of large scale data sources on digital social networks to  learn how their intangible advantages 
(histories and track records, customer relations and trust,  knowledge of transactions and customers, and 
their behaviour when transacting), could be adapted and strengthened against such threats.  They had to 
learn how to integrate the bank (technology and intangibles) into new customer products, such as new ways 
of payment, saving, insurance and borrowing.  
 
They had to learn about new customer behaviour and how bank agents can adapt their behaviour with 
customers. New versions of the ‘human touch’ (in bank agents and bank system ‘behaviour’) integrated with 
new forms of technology had to be invented to create conditions for customers to continue to allow 
delegated monitoring by banks and for banks to manage new risks.  
 
     Rapid change, major problems and risks in socio-economic networks, technology, and knowledge 
capabilities can contribute to financial risks and reduce the explanatory power of delegated monitoring 
theory.  In the extreme of sudden unanticipated events such theory has no explanatory power.  Delegated 
monitoring by large scale investors failed during the GFC. Mortgages were mis-sold to credit-poor customers 
in the US and repackaged as high grade securities by banks and rating agencies. These were sold through 
many bank intermediaries and bought by ultimate investors. When the US housing market failed, many 
mortgages failed, leading to major value reductions in the securities. Initial contracting and subsequent 
monitoring along this transaction chain failed and ultimate investors lost large sums of money.  This 
illustrates how problems with knowledge, capabilities, and behaviour, have been the basis for knowledge and 
social risks, and both contributed to financial risks.  
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5.3 Liquidity insurance theory - learning about customers, transactions and liquidity:  
 
Diamond and Dybvig  (1983) argued that financial intermediaries provided liquidity insurance. They created 
‘pools of liquidity’ to insure customers against shocks that affect their consumption needs, and to help 
customers smooth their consumption. The BTFF develops these ideas by arguing that liquidity insurance was 
based on Bank/FI intangibles (social structures, financial and statistical expertise, and information), financial 
resources, and their combined strengths. These were learnt, developed and mobilised over time for liquidity 
management purposes. Rapid change can reduce the explanatory power of liquidity insurance theory.   
 
Learning about financial resources and liquidity - developing financial expertise 
During periods of stability and gradual change in customer behaviour and external conditions, gradual 
learning was possible about statistical and social processes concerning financial resources and their liquidity. 
 
Liquidity management required active learning and development of liquidity management capabilities and 
financial expertise or expert knowledge (Preda, 2005).  The latter included knowledge of required cash 
reserves, liquidity characteristics of assets and liabilities, and their statistical behaviour.   Banks/FIs learnt 
how liquidity risks occurred on both sides of the balance sheet, liquidity varied with the nature of the liability 
or asset, and how various market mechanisms could be used to turn illiquid assets into cash. Learning also 
involved creating statistical knowledge about deposit portfolio risks and how to exploit the ‘law of large 
numbers’ in retail depositor behaviour (Lewis and Davies, 1987). Banks learnt how to diversify liquidity  
risks across retail deposit segments and wholesale deposit segments.  
 
Learning about social resources to support liquidity 
 
Banks and FIs also learnt how customer’s liquidity behaviour created diversification opportunities, and could 
be predicted and incentivised. This knowledge was the basis to manage social behaviour and its risks to 
control liquidity. They learnt how to adapt their behaviour and products, to create desirable behavioural 
liquidity conditions in customers, on both asset and liability sides. 
 
     Learning about social assets as networks or multiple ‘relations’ amongst customers (retail, wholesale,) 
clients, and other banks and FI was essential for liquidity management. For example, learning how to create 
customer ‘relations’ on both asset and liability sides of the balance sheets was essential. They were used to 
create unique ‘socially based information systems’ about customers, clients and other banks and FIs 
(Holland, 1994). ‘Relations’ as an informal contract were seen as an 'exchange of implicit insurance 
contracts' in which the banks or FIs  offered to insure their customers against a portion of, or the major part 
of, the financial supply, liquidity, and financial price contingencies  facing them (Holland, 1994).  
 
          Banks and FIs also used their social resources (reputation, ranking, ‘relationships’) and information 
systems to learn about variation and uncertainty in liability (eg depositor) behaviour (consumption and 
spending) across different customer segments during changing economic times and volatile periods. The 
customer segments could range from a set of retail customer segments, small businesses, large firms and 
large banks. They learnt how these liquidity behaviours were ‘normally’ offset (uncorrelated) and 
diversified; across a large number of customer segments. This was the basis to create a ‘pool’ of diversified 
liquid capital for investing in less liquid but more profitable assets (such as loans).  
 
    Over time management learnt how key intangibles could be combined and connected to influence 
customers. For example, high quality relational capital in the customer base could be merged with brand 
power and customer information systems to create information and influence advantages concerning 
customer behaviour (Chen et al, 2014). The combination created the capability to improve information 
conditions and reduce transaction costs arising during the initial search or screen for customer opportunities 
(in retail, investment and wholesale banking), in bargaining, and in monitoring customer use of a wide range 
of bank/FI services (Dahlman, 1979). The combination created capabilities to improve predictions of 
customer liquidity behaviour, incentivise customers, negotiate with customers, and reduce liquidity shocks.   
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Bank/FIs used this knowledge to incentivise ‘relationship’ customers to change levels of assets and liabilities 
and their liquidity characteristics when required.  For example, in stable tiers in wholesale banking markets, 
small price increases were used to command deposits.  In retail markets, preferential terms were offered to 
‘relationship’ borrowers to encourage ‘early settlements’ of say hire purchase loans or credit card debt. 
 
The above learning created bank/FI capabilities to be ‘consumption smoothers’ for their ‘relationship’ 
customers by offering insurance against consumer or depositor consumption shocks. The combination of 
knowledge, social relations, and technology created the means for retail banks and FIs to know how to 
’satisfy the liquidity needs of individual investors’ (liquidity insurance theory; Buckle et al, 2011).  They 
were also the means for wholesale banks to satisfy the liquidity of other large banks in their shared ‘tiers’ 
(Lewis and Davies, 1987). 
 
Learning about liquidity during rapid change and uncertainty 
 
Rapid change, major problems and risks in socio-economic networks and markets contributed to financial 
risks and reduced the explanatory power of Liquidity insurance theory. Learning was difficult in periods of 
rapid change and was impossible when sudden shocks occurred and created uncertainty. Liquidity 
diversification benefits vanished during periods of uncertainty. This constrained bank use of some types of 
deposit sources such as wholesale deposits where systemic risk could quickly replace diversification benefits 
 
During and post the GFC banks and FIs learnt how banks such as Northern Rock could experience a bank 
run on their retail bank deposits when they suffered a freeze on their interbank deposits.  Historic learning by 
large established ‘top tier’ banks meant that in 2007 they withdrew their wholesale deposits from ‘lower tier’ 
banks such as Northern Rock. They did this with relatively smaller newcomer banks in a ‘flight to quality’ to 
avoid contagion and a bank panic. Lower tier banks learnt that they were in a fragile ‘pecking order’ or ‘tier’ 
for liquidity in interbank wholesale deposit markets, and they had to match their lending and asset liquidity 
decisions to this situation. 
 
Inability to learn during gradual change, and limited financial firm knowledge during rapid change such as 
the GFC contributed to the severe liquidity problems. This involved limited knowledge of asset markets, 
social structures in markets, the nature of shocks, and fragility of asset and liability markets to sudden 
shocks. Stable social relations and stable statistical relations for liquidity of financial resources, both fell 
apart together when uncertainty occurred. Problems with capabilities and networks generated knowledge and 
social risks, which contributed to financial risks. The financial firms that survived without government help 
relied on liquidity of their slack resources and preparations made through use of early warning systems.  The 
BTFF is designed to support such contingency planning by designing robust intangibles to support financial 
resource use in range of circumstances 
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5.4 Theory of asset transformation – learning about risk management at portfolio and firm levels: 
 
Buckle et al (2011) note that financial intermediaries transformed assets in order to satisfy simultaneously 
the different requirements of financial capital users and suppliers in terms of maturity, size and risk. The 
BTFF develops these ideas by arguing that asset transformation was based on Bank/FI intangibles, financial 
resources, and their combined strengths. These were learnt, developed and mobilised over time. Rapid 
change can reduce the explanatory power of asset transformation theory.   
 
This section begins with an assumption of stability or gradual change in the environment of banks and FIs. It 
discusses how financial expertise was a key knowledge source in asset transformation.  However, other 
knowledge based and social intangibles were critical to full exploitation of financial expertise in financial 
capital transformation. This section also explores rapid change and uncertainty, how intangible resources 
became major sources of financial risks, and how asset transformation failed.   
 
Financial expertise and asset transformation: - in conditions of stability or gradual change 
 
Financial expertise was a specialized form of knowledge in banks and FIs, derived from experience, training 
and finance theory, and focused on financial resources alone. It played a critical role in the transformation of 
financial capital and its risks. More specifically, banks and FI management acquired expert knowledge 
(Preda, 2005) about a wide range of connected principles and mechanisms of financial risk management 
including, contracting, diversification, matching and mismatching, and use of reserves of capital and 
liquidity. Management mobilized this knowledge in the transformation of financial capital and its risks. 
 
For example, they diversified financial risks using principles such as the ‘law of large numbers’ for loans and 
deposits, and MPT for equities. They diversified sources of liabilities and assets to invest in.  Management 
matched and mismatched assets and liabilities, both on balance sheet, and in markets (re-insure, co-insure); 
and sought to influence asset and liability interest rates or returns for positive margins (Lewis and Davies, 
1987). They used ‘Off balance sheet’ means in derivatives markets for liquidity management, risk 
management, and asset transformation. They used capital (cash and equity) as ‘buffers’ against liability and 
asset risks (eg deposit withdrawal, bad debt). They managed cross-balance sheet effects by exploiting good 
asset side performance and practice as signals to encourage the supply of capital, and vice versa.  
 
The active mobilisation of expert knowledge or financial expertise  in the above financial decision areas,  by 
bank/FI agents,  was the basis for creating information and controlling behaviour. This was used: to reduce 
transactions costs, control liquidity, and transform asset and liabilities by size, maturity and risk (Buckle et al 
2011). The ongoing transactions and decisions about financial assets and liabilities were made by highly 
specialised ‘front office’ staff in financial markets for savings, investment and other financial services. Such 
risk management practices were also set by regulation based on established expert knowledge. 
 
  Thus top management learnt how all these financial risk factors interacted and could be managed 
(‘juggled’) together. They used financial expertise to create a stable bank or FI as a financial ‘risk machine’ 
exploiting relatively stable offsetting stochastic processes for assets and liabilities. They managed the 
interactions to allow the bank or FI to intermediate or transform financial capital by size, maturity, risk, and 
liquidity to create value or profit.   They therefore learnt how to manage aggregate transaction risk in the 
form of financial asset and liability portfolio risks, and hence risks of intermediation processes in financial 
firms. 
 
Asset transformation and joint risks of intangibles and financial resources:  
   - in conditions of stability or gradual change 
 
Specialised financial knowledge had a central role in the transformation of financial capital and its risks in 
financial firms.  However, section 3 has shown that Banks and FIs have learnt they must ‘juggle’ or manage 
the combination of intangibles risks (knowledge, social relations), tangibles risks (technology), and financial 
risks together.  They have learnt it is not a question of managing financial resources and their risks alone in 
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transforming financial capital and its risks. Understanding intangibles and theirs risks were critical to 
understanding financial risks and to full exploitation of financial expertise.  
 
The development of intellectual capital (IC) (Meritum, 2002), as human capital (HC), structural capital (SC), 
and social or relational capital (RC) was required for asset transformation. Learning about: financial 
expertise, other knowledge resources, social resources, and their risks; and how they interacted with financial 
resources and risks; was the basis to manage combined risks. These capabilities were means to create a stable 
bank or FI as a ‘joint intangibles and financial risk machine’ in which appropriate financial expertise, other 
knowledge and social resources, were matched to stochastic processes in financial resources.  This was the 
basis for financial firms to manage special risks associated with intangibles and their impact on financial 
resources and risks (Chen et al, 2014; Holland, 2016). It was the means to use knowledge and social 
resources to transform financial resources or ’to satisfy simultaneously the different requirements of lenders 
and borrowers in terms of maturity, size, and risk’ (as noted in asset transformation theory (Buckle et al 
2011). Learning about these non financial matters was the basis for asset transformation with existing 
transactions and with future and promised transactions. 
 
The GFC and technological change post 2007 showed how special risks arose in the intangibles and how 
these created financial risks. Active renewal of intangible resources through learning was essential for 
continued risk management. Recent development in integrated reporting (IIRC, 2013) has illustrated how 
boards and top managements teams in banks have sought to develop intangibles and construct them such  
that their unique intangible risks were managed, and the impact of their risks on financial risks (and other 
risks) was understood and managed  (Larsen and Tan, 2015). Managing the new technological, knowledge 
and social media risks has required the development of  new bank/FI skills and capabilities. Top 
management have had to learn how tangibles risks and intangible risks interact and have to be managed 
(‘juggled’) together to create a stable bank or FI made up of stable offsetting risks both tangible and 
intangible.  
 
In finance theory terms internal based intangibles, technology and MIS, were designed to reduce information 
and behavioural problems within the firm. The internal intangibles included organisation structure, 
organisational control processes, employment contracts and incentive schemes.  The combined resources 
were intended to reduce principal–agent problems between bank/FI board and top management teams, and 
between them and middle management and front line employees (Heffernan, 2005).  This created stable 
internal knowledge and social conditions for using bank/FI financial expertise to match and mismatch 
balance sheet assets and liabilities by size, maturity and risk, and hence contributed to asset transformation. 
 
Customer facing intangibles 
 
Customer facing intangibles such as relations and brands, were also designed to control information and 
influence behavioural problems, and hence principal–agent problems with external agents such as corporate 
or retail customers (Heffernan. 2005). These resources created stable external conditions for: using bank/FI 
financial expertise to create information, find and satisfy customer needs in a predictable way, create trust 
when transacting,  spread off balance sheet risks in markets; and hence contributed to asset transformation. 
 
For example, Lewis and Davies (1987) discussed how in wholesale banks, learning about and maintaining 
‘tiers’ (or ‘clubs’ of similar size and ‘quality’ banks) in interbank markets, was essential for banks to transact 
with each other  in very large deposits. Holland (1994) also discussed how large banks: 
 
‘relied on multiple close(corporate) relations to guarantee a steady demand for their services. These were the base for rich flows of 
information concerning the financial needs and health of the client firms and were used by the banks to reduce the many risks faced 
in corporate banking.’  
 
Social relations in interbank ‘tiers’ were the basis for wholesale supply of interbank deposits. Banks’ 
relations within the ‘tiers’ and with core groups of large firms were also used for syndicated lending. 
Principles of financial risk sharing in wholesale markets, through re-insure and co-insure methods (Lewis 
and Davies, 1987), and associated financial metrics, depended on confidence conditions in ‘tiers’ or social 
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networks between banks of similar size, financial resources, and capabilities.  Thus social networks were 
important means for exploiting financial expertise in the transformation of financial capital and its risks.  
Such select groups of large banks and large firms can be interpreted as ‘status groups’ (Preda, 2005) ‘They 
emphasize reputation, honour and good social behaviour as stabilizers of collective action, as means of social control 
and as indicators of legitimacy’ and they ‘confer legitimacy upon financial actors and transactions’. 
 
 In the case of retail banks, learning about and creating customer relations was important for developing and 
maintaining brands and reputation in markets for deposit supply and loan demand. They learnt how customer 
experience and satisfaction contributed to bank reputation and brand power. Banks learnt how customer 
relations and trust were the means to ensure continuous information flows across various retail customer 
segments. Relations as an informal contract were seen as an 'exchange of implicit insurance contracts'  
concerning expected behaviour and transaction activity between banks and customers (Holland, 1994) 
 
In both retail and wholesale cases learning about social networks and how to maintain them were means to 
create unique ‘socially based information systems’ about customers, clients, other banks and FIs (Holland, 
1994). Social networks were central to, attracting and holding onto sources of funds (eg deposits), and to 
creating confidence in liability (eg deposit) mismatching with longer term assets (eg loans). Learning about 
these social assets, how to maintain them, and how to signal this information, was important to ensure capital 
suppliers (eg depositors) had confidence in asset/liability mismatches. It was important in understanding how 
to exploit financial expertise in the transformation of financial capital and its risks. The development of 
‘relations’ created a form of two way insurance between banks and customers, and was a means to stabilise 
supply and demand behaviour concerning financial assets and liabilities. Understanding these social and 
behavioural contexts provided a basis for exploiting financial expertise in the transformation of financial 
capital and its risks. 
 
Rapid change - Intangible resources as major sources of financial risks 
 
Rapid change combined with limited learning can create major problems and exposure to risks in bank/FI 
socio-economic networks, technology, and knowledge capabilities. These can contribute to increased 
exposure to risk with financial resources. The combined exposure conditions can coincide with major 
unanticipated events, contribute to extreme financial risks, and potentially lead to bank/FI failure. Examples 
of major unanticipated events include, major technological failures in single financial firm or group of firms, 
‘disruptive technology’ emerging in markets, and major issues of confidence between financial firms in inter 
firm markets and retail markets 
 
 In the GFC large banks lost confidence in each other and their financial resources,  leading to a ‘liquidity 
freeze’ in interbank deposit markets. At the same time, socio-economic ‘tiers’ as transacting and risk sharing 
and risk ceding mechanisms ( co-insure and re-insure methods, Lewis and Davies, 1987) failed for both 
deposit and credit markets. The problems with financial resources and social resources led to a failure in 
asset transformation. These events highlighted how financial risk and social risk were intimately connected. 
 
In a retail bank example, special risks have arisen from the combination of knowledge, social networks and 
technology resources.  Customers have used social media and the internet to magnify and broadcast their 
concerns with retail banks for service disruptions and loss of data, leading to rapid loss of trust and 
confidence. This has created correlations between previously uncorrelated customer behaviours and bank 
liabilities and assets leading to new systemic risks in asset transformation. 
 
Such rapid change conditions have reduced the explanatory power of asset transformation theory and the 
effectiveness of financial expertise and associated risk management metrics for management. With extreme 
unanticipated events, all conventional statistical relations vanish (for financial resources and quantitative 
measures of their risks). In the extreme of sudden unanticipated events, knowledge resources such as asset 
transformation theory, financial expertise, and associated financial metrics, have had no explanatory power. 
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6. Implications for regulators and regulation  
 
      The development of an embryonic ‘Behavioural theory of the financial firm’ identifies two roles for 
regulators of financial firms.  Firstly they can combine with other bodies to further develop a BTFF and 
‘conceptual connections’ to established finance theory.  Secondly they can use the BTFF and ‘connections’ 
to think about new ways to regulate financial firms, and construct a new regulatory architecture.  
 
6.1 Further development of theory and research 
 
Authors such as: Scholtens and Wensveen (2003), Keasey and Hudson, (2007) and Gendron’s et al (2013); 
have recognised problems with finance theory, the need to introduce new ideas, and to improve theory 
construction processes. This paper has shown how this can be done in systematic manner.   Regulators can 
play an active role here. 
 
In the UK, the PRA, the FCA (and its predecessor the FSA; Turner, 2009) and Bank of England (King 
2014, Carney 2015), have recognised the problems of traditional finance theory and the need for change. 
These regulatory agents could use their research capabilities and privileged access in banks and FIs to 
create knowledge about these firms. They could exploit recent development in integrated reporting (IIRC, 
2013) and banking (Larsen and Tan, 2015) to promote this idea. They can demand that banks and FIs make 
a contribution to new ‘theories of practice’ and develop a more comprehensive ‘Behavioural theory of the 
financial firm’. 
 
Regulators can also play a role in encouraging academics to break out their discipline based ‘silos’ by co-
operating with public bodies funding academic research. The latter can use their funding power and 
research evaluation power to influence the change process in finance research and theory construction. In 
the UK this involves research councils such as the ESRC and bodies such as HEFC and their involvement 
in research funding and research quality assessment processes (REF) of finance academics.  All of the 
primary agents in the fields of practice and academe must liaise on joint change strategies to gain the 
maximum change effect.  For example, key UK agents and bodies: such as bank/FI regulators in the form 
of the PRA, FCA and Bank of England: and Funding and Research councils such as HEFC and ESRC; as 
well as professional bodies; must liaise on ‘developing empirical understandings of the social networks in 
which financial innovation occurs’ (Rooney et al, 2013). 
 
6.2 New ways to regulate financial firms: 
 
The BTTF and the analysis of problems make it clear that regulators will have to assess how to influence 
bank/FI change and learning, and construction of knowledge and social resources. They will have to 
understand how these changes and intangibles contexts play a role in bank/FI conduct with customers in 
markets, and how change and new forms of conduct influence bank/FI financial risk and risk management.  
 
For example, literature on ‘organisational learning’ could be used by regulators to think how to monitor and 
influence change processes. Pedler et al, (1997) discuss empirical findings and theoretical analysis of 
effective learning in large organisations. This could be the basis for ‘good practice’ guidance by regulators 
for bank/FI learning, and for integrated bank/FI reporting on their development of intangible drivers in their 
business model (IIRC, 2103). Other researchers such as Harris (2002), Antonacopoulou, (2006), Chivers, 
(2011), Royal et al (2012) provide insight into bank learning. 
 
Stress testing of the financial parameters of business models, and of management choices for risk 
management, have been implemented by bank regulators (Bank of England, 2016).  However,  boards and 
top management in large banks and FIs especially those in the TBTF category must also be regularly 
assessed and ‘stress tested’ to see if they understand and believe in their models, have taken actions to ensure 
their models remain stable and robust; and their management skills remain relevant.  Top management and 
board members in TBTF banks and FIs should be ‘stress tested’ on their knowledge and experience of how 
social and knowledge resources can be used to transform financial resources and risks. The BTFF offers a 
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framework to design the tests, and to structure public disclosure of tests of bank/FI management capabilities 
and attitudes.  If they fail they should lose their ‘masters ticket’   to steer such large ‘ships’. Stress testing can 
be extended to: financial firm organisation, routines, control systems, culture, stability of external networks; 
and how these factors interact in periods of high change and threat. Stress tests should not just focus on 
bank/FI capital, cash, liquidity and other financial parameters. They should concern these knowledge and 
social structures as sources of financial risk in TBTF banks, other FIs,  and the wider financial system. 
      This paper argues that regulators should focus on changes in bank/FI social conditions, with particular 
focus on culture and how it changes. If we take the example of banks in 2017, regulators such as the FCA, 
BSB, and G30 sought to influence and change existing bank culture, and behaviour in transactions. They did 
so in the interests of fair dealing with customers and clients, and effective functioning of markets. These 
approaches may prove beneficial but desired changes in banking culture will always be limited if regulators 
ignore the wider context and changes discussed in the BTFF. However, regulators can understand, influence 
and, in part, manage bank culture, by using theoretical work such as Schein (2004) to think about bank 
culture and culture in a wider bank system.  Understanding the role of culture can be enhanced if this single 
social factor is placed within a BTFF of many interacting social, knowledge, and financial resource factors. 
         Finally, the paper notes that new regulation has a strong focus on changing existing conduct by bank 
agents. For example, changes in the UK have been made in banks concerning capital and remuneration and 
risk management. Other changes such as the ‘Senior Managers Regime’ will hold bank top management 
accountable for misconduct. New joint regulation in July 2015 by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) regulation in 2015 on responsibility of bank management 
(Allen Overy, 2014), was a positive move in this direction. However regulators can improve understanding 
of the role of board and top management factors if these ad hoc changes are placed within a BTFF of many 
interacting social, knowledge, and financial resource factors.  Single factor analysis in a changing, 
interacting world, is the route to future failures. 
 
7. Summary     
      The paper has sought to rethink empirical models and theory used in explaining banks and financial 
institutions, and to enhance the process of theory construction.  The change strategy for finance research 
and theory construction involved using a combination of empirical and alternative theoretical narratives, to 
develop an embryonic ‘behavioral theory of the financial firm’.  This has been used to develop   
‘conceptual connections’ to traditional finance theory ideas of financial intermediation.  
       This is a provisional response to the call post GFC by many authors such as Colander et al (2009), 
Holland (2010), Gendron at al (2013) for a new approach to developing theory in the world of finance and 
financial institutions and to respond to problems identified with theory. It therefore develops a stream of 
thought begun by Allen and Santomero (1998), and extended by Scholtens and van Wensveen  (2003),  
Keasey and Hudson (2007), and  Holland (2010).  
    The combined set of ideas demonstrates the potential to develop a new explanatory frame for financial 
firms. This approach does not seek to ‘integrate’ traditional finance theory and alternative theory in ‘meta 
theory’. The more modest aim is to improve theory content by providing examples of conceptual 
‘connections’ between theories. The approach provided means to address some of the problems identified 
with traditional finance theory, and to develop a strategy for active theory construction.   The paper seeks 
both connections and diversity in paradigms used.  This can enhance processes and incentives for academics 
and practitioners underpinning theory construction.  The ideas developed also create new opportunities to 
challenge the aims and claims of finance theory, to propose changes in banks and FIs, and to suggest changes 
in the focus of regulation. If managers, regulators and academics wish to exploit FTFI in a changing world 
they must be aware of dynamic conceptual connections between BTFF and FTFI and not use a static version 
of FTFI by itself. 
     Finally, the paper provides a new analytical tool for policy makers and regulators. Regulators must broaden 
the focus of regulation and regulate change, learning, knowledge, culture, and not just conduct. They must 
focus on these and on knowledge and social resources, not just financial resources in banks and FIs. They must 
‘stress test’ management knowledge, financial firm organisation, culture, as well as ‘financials’. 
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